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Automated policies govern the decision-making 
processes of the system. Given accuracy/success and elapsed 
time in missile defense, it is not feasible for humans be 
in the decision loop other than for making overrides. The 
computer is required to do all the policy checking, 
monitoring and enforcement. The ROE policy automation is a 
vital link to the ultimate success or failure of a BMD 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. BACKGROUND .........................................1 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ...............................2 
1. What is a Policy? .............................3 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS .........................3 
II. MISSILE DEFENSE AND ROE .................................5 
A. BACKGROUND OF MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE “ABM” ........5 
1. What Work has Been Done? ......................5 
B. GENERAL ROE DISCUSSION .............................8 
1. What are Rules of Engagement? .................8 
C. ROE AUTOMATION IN MISSILE DEFENSE .................11 
1. Why Automate ROE? ............................11 
III. POLICY AUTOMATION SYSTEM FOR MISSILE DEFENSE ...........13 
A. DISCUSSION OF APPLICABLE SYSTEMS ..................13 
1. Background ...................................13 
2. Policy System ................................15 
3. Policy Workbench .............................18 
4. Generic Intercept System .....................21 
IV. THE ROE UNIT OF THE BATTLE MANAGER .....................25 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................25 
B. ARCHITECTURE ......................................26 
C. USE CASE ANALYSIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES ....28 
1. High Level System Use Case Analysis ..........29 
2. Use Case for ROE Unit ........................32 
3. Deriving Rules for Expert System .............35 
a. Proposed ROE Policies ...................38 
4. A Policy Model ...............................42 
a. Example of Policy Model for ROE Unit ....43 
D. UNDERSTANDING DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE USING AN ONTOLOGY ..44 
1. Ontology for Sensor Domain ...................45 
2. Weapons Related Ontology .....................47 
3. C2 Related Ontology ..........................48 
4. Sample Ontology for Missile Defense Domain ...50 
5. Example of a Threat Engagement by ROEU .......51 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................51 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .........................53 
A. REVISITING THE ISSUES .............................53 
B. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROE 
UNIT ..............................................54 
1. Functional Requirements ......................54 
2. Non-functional Requirements ..................55 
 viii
C. FUTURE WORK .......................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................59 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Weapon Assignment (From Caffall,2005)............7 
Figure 2. General Policy Architecture(From Buibish et 
al., 2005)......................................17 
Figure 3. Policy Workbench (From Sibley et al.,1992)......21 
Figure 4. Generic Intercept System........................24 
Figure 5. ROE Unit........................................28 
Figure 6. Intercept System Use Case.......................31 
Figure 7. Use Case for ROEU...............................33 
Figure 8. Activity Diagram for Intercept System...........36 
Figure 9. Policy Model Primary Classes  (From Strassner, 
2004)...........................................43 
Figure 10. Partial Sensor domain ontology (From Lopez, 
2002)...........................................46 
Figure 11. Partial Sensor Ontology (From Davis,2004).......47 
Figure 12. Remake of Semantic-Enabled Orchestration (From 
Andrade,2007)...................................48 
Figure 13. Sample C2 Domain Ontology.......................49 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Automation Table (From Ensley, 1995)............15 




































Acquisition: The process in which the Department of Defense 
obtains materiel solutions to identified problems in 
mission need statements. 
Active component: A component that will execute based on 
external conditions and a defined set of rules. 
Architecture: the collection of logical and physical views, 
constraints, and decisions that define the external 
properties of a system and provide a shared understanding 
of the system design to the development team and the 
intended user of the system. 
Automation: is the use of control systems such as computers 
to control industrial machinery and processes, replacing 
human operators. 
Availability: The probability that a system is operating 
correctly and is ready to perform its desired functions. 
Backward Chaining: Beings with a list of goals (or a 
hypothesis) and works backwards from the consequent to the 
antecedent to see if there is data available that will 
support any of these consequents. 
Battle management: The decisions and actions executed in 
direct response to the activities of enemy forces in 
support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s precision engagement 
concept. 
Battlespace constraints: The forces, facilities, and other 
features that serve to restrain, restrict, or prevent the 
implementation of proposed military improvements in the  
 
 xiv
defined battlespace. Constraints may include natural and 
physical forces, doctrine, potential adversary threats, and 
environmental features. 
Battlespace: The environment, factors, and conditions that 
must be understood to successfully apply combat power, 
protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes 
the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and 
friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the 
electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment 
within the operational areas and areas of interest. 
Capability: The ability to perform a course of action or 
sequence of activities leading to a desired outcome. 
Chain of command: The succession of commanding officers 
from a superior to a subordinate through which command is 
exercised.  
Close-air-support: Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft against hostile targets that are in close 
proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed 
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement 
of those forces. 
Coalition: An ad hoc arrangement between two or more 
nations for common action. 
Combatant command (command authority): Non-transferable 
command authority established by title 10, United States 
Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified 
or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed 
by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant 
command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant 
commander to perform those functions of command over 
 xv
assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands 
and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 
giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military 
operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to 
accomplish the missions assigned to the command. 
Combatant command: One of the unified or specified 
combatant commands established by the President.  
Command and control system: The facilities, equipment, 
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a 
commander for planning, directing, and controlling 
operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions 
assigned.  
Command and control: The exercise of authority and 
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned 
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Command and control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, 
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
and operations in the accomplishment of the mission 
(JCS/J7/Joint Doctrine Division memo dated 20 Oct 94). 
Completeness: A logical system is complete if everything 
that we want can be derived in it. Thus a formalization of 
logic is complete if all logically valid forms of argument 
are derivable in the system. 
Component: A software unit of composition with 
contractually specified interfaces and explicit context 
dependencies.  
 xvi
Computer Network Operations: Comprised of computer network 
attack, computer network defense, and related computer 
network exploitation enabling operations. 
Control: Authority which may be less than full command 
exercised by a commander over part of the activities of 
subordinate or other organizations. 
Correctness: A characteristic of a system that precisely 
exhibits predictable behavior at all times as defined by 
the system specifications. That is, a system that is said 
to demonstrate correctness does the right thing all the 
time. 
Cyber Engagement: an engagement that takes place in the 
domain of cyberspace.  
Data: A representation of individual facts, concepts, or 
instructions in a manner suitable for communication, 
interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic 
means. [IEEE] 
Dependable system: One that provides the appropriate levels 
of correctness and robustness in accomplishing its mission 
while demonstrating the appropriate levels of availability, 
consistency, reliability, safety, and recoverability. 
Design: The details of planned implementation which are 
defined, structured, and constrained by the architecture 
Distributed system: A system that has multiple processors 
that are connected by a communications structure. 
Engagement: 1. In air defense, an attack with guns or air-
to-air missiles by an interceptor aircraft, or the launch 
of an air defense missile by air defense artillery and the  
 
 xvii
missile’s subsequent travel to intercept. 2. A tactical 
conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver 
forces. 
Forward chaining: It is one of the two main methods of 
reasoning when using inference rules starts with the 
available data and uses inference rules to extract more 
data until an end state is reached. 
Information: The meaning that a human assigns to data by 
means of the known conventions used in their 
representation.  
Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, 
processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
countries or areas.  
Interoperability: The ability of systems, units, or forces 
to provide services to and accept services from other 
systems, units, or forces and to use the services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.  
Model: A representation of a physical system or process 
intended to enhance the software engineer’s ability to 
understand, predict, or control its behavior. 
Multiple inheritance: refers to a feature of some object-
oriented programming languages in which a class can inherit 
behaviors and features from more than one super class 
Requirement: A criterion that a system must meet. A 
requirement may define what a system must do, 
characteristics it must have, and levels of performance it 
must attain. 
 xviii
Rules of engagement: Directives issued by competent 
military authority that delineate the circumstances and 
limitations under which United States forces will initiate 
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered.  
Subsystem: A testable collection of classes, objects, 
components, and modules that typically share a common 
attribute or contribute to a common goal.  
System-of-Systems: An amalgamation of legacy systems and 
developing systems that provides an enhanced military 
capability greater than that of any of the individual 
systems within the system-of-systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
As far back as the events that took place in the 
bible, there was the concern of war or the threat 
associated with such events.   Overtime, the weapons used 
to wage war have evolved from merely throwing fists, to 
rocks, to cannon balls, to bullets, and now, to highly 
precise and extremely destructive nuclear capable missiles.  
In addition to the threats of particular weapons systems, 
there is an increasing concern of leaders who have 
professed to be willing to use them.  In the period of the 
Cold War, 1947–1991, there was fear of the weapon, but also 
there was the unspoken knowledge that neither side really 
intended to resort to that level of conflict with one 
another due to the catastrophic results.  In this new era, 
when there are countries with those capabilities and 
leaders who have the professed willingness to use it, there 
is heightened concern to protect oneself from the potential 
that a missile strike could be pointed in our direction.  
This threat is not limited just to countries that posses 
these capabilities but also from terrorist groups that aim 
to disrupt and destroy our way of life.   
An effective missile defense will guard the U.S. and 
her allies against becoming susceptible to the nuclear or 
any other type of threat initiated by other nations or 
rouge actors.  The United States needed to pursue a system 




countries.  This defense is against a limited attack by a 
rogue nation or unauthorized or limited objective attack 
(ULOA).   
Despite the research and development effort taken in 
the past eight years, even today as reflected in the latest 
discussions on missile defense, we still have not 
accomplished the goal of establishing a viable Missile 
Defense System for the United States. This fact was best 
illustrated on September 29, 2009, when John Issacs was 
quoted in an Associated Press article by Richard Lardner 
titled New missile defense plan bets on Navy interceptors 
stating "I don't think you can really count on any missile 
defense system at this point."  John Issacs is the 
executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation in Washington.      
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The task of this work is to use software engineering 
methods to analyze and propose the design of a Ballistic 
Missile Defense System that takes into account the 
automation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) polices.  We apply 
use case analysis to understand the roles ROE plays in 
various missile defense scenarios. We study the 
architecture of existing policy automation systems for 
various domains and develop a design for a Rules of 
Engagement Unit (ROEU) necessary for the Battle Manager of 
the Ballistic Missile Defense System with ROE polices 
automation capabilities.  We also present the architecture 
of a “Generic Intercept System” to show how the proposed 
ROEU system, when interfaced appropriately, can work with 
existing components of the missile defense.   
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1. What is a Policy? 
As we begin the discussion, we need to explore the 
general idea of policy automation for distributed systems.  
This will bring us closer to realizing the complete 
creation of the proposed system.  Automated ROE policies, 
as a system or a component, can be effectively utilized in 
any environment whether that is missile defense or defense 
of weapons in the non-kinetic realm of Computer Network 
Operations.  The main premise to understand is that 
automated ROE policies are necessary and vital for BMD or 
intercept system success.   
We begin this discussion with a generalized definition 
of policy, created by Strassner (2004) to be extensible for 
various domains, including the military domain.  Policy is 
a set of rules that are used to manage and control the 
changing and/or maintaining of the state of one or more 
managed objects.  Reis et al. sees policies as generic and 
reusable rules that allow definition of: syntactic 
properties for process models (static); instantiation 
strategies (instantiation); and reaction strategies in 
response to dynamic events.  Policies are best understood 
as the rules that govern or influence the behavior of a 
particular system.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
At the end of Chapter I, the reader will walk away 
with a solid foundation and understanding of the purpose 
for this work.  They will know what a policy is.  Chapter 
II begins with a review of what work has already been done 
with regards to missile defense.  We then discuss ROE and 
why automation of ROE is so important.  Chapter III 
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provides examples of policy automation systems.  We will 
present the primary model for our suggested Ballistic 
Missile Defense System, which we call a “Generic Intercept 
System.”  We have identified processes and systems that are 
already in existence to realize our proposed design.  In 
Chapter IV, we will discuss the ROE Unit (ROEU) that will 
be designed and used as an automated policy system.  The 
discussion will cover the development of a design for such 
a system. There will be a discussion of the process for 
creating the ROE policies. Specific components of the 
proposed system are addressed.  Scenarios will be created 
in order to evaluate the system in a perceived environment—
from these scenarios use case and activity diagram will be 
presented.  Such diagrams reflect the interfaces with the 
system and the process or actions of the system given a 
particular situation.  We will provide examples of key 
elements of the ROEU to include a proposed ontology for the 
Missile Defense Domain, as well as rules for the ROE 
polices that are compatible with a Policy model. Finally, 
in Chapter V, we will conclude with a summary of this work 
and recommendations for future research. We show one 
primary example being the requirements analysis of a policy 




II. MISSILE DEFENSE AND ROE 
A. BACKGROUND OF MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE “ABM” 
1. What Work has Been Done? 
In March of 2005, Dr. Dale Scott Caffall wrote his 
doctorial dissertation on the topic “Developing Dependable 
Software for a System of Systems.”  There are many roads 
open before us, but none that are paved now started without 
a beaten path.  Dr. Caffall was not the first, but his 
direction has provided significant influences for this 
thesis.  With regards to the specific contributions that 
were made by his work in the area of missile defense, there 
are quite a few.  These contributions include the 
identification of distributed-system attributes for 
controlling software in a system-of-systems, and the 
identification of real-time attributes for real-time 
controlling software in a reactive system-of-systems. He 
contributed to the development of system-of-systems 
architecture views from system-of-systems view to component 
view in controlling software.  He also addressed the use of 
a kernel in controlling software for system-of-systems to 
shape dependable behavior of said system-of-systems.  He 
has proposed to reduce the complexity of a monolithic 
software program with a component-based construct in which 
the active components are decoupled by data stores.  He 
discussed the development of assertions using collaboration 
diagrams (Caffall, 2005).   
Dr. Caffall’s research shows the possibility of 
developing a system-of-systems architecture from which we 
can analyze/develop the controlling software for a system-
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of-systems.  It demonstrates that we can realize the 
controlling software from a system-of-systems architecture 
through the concepts of component-based software 
engineering.  More importantly, we are able to apply formal 
methods in the design and development of the controlling 
software for a system-of-systems by specifying the 
requirements for the software components with assertions 
and employing a runtime verification tool to verify the 
desired behavior specified in the assertions.   
In addition, Caffall’s work addresses some of the 
challenges posed by David Parnas in 1985 to the Department 
of Defense on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  
David Parnas was one of the original pioneers in the 
efforts to develop a successful missile defense program.  
Parnas’ six major concerns are articulated as:  
1. Discrimination of the threat objects from 
decoys and debris is a significant challenge.  2. 
Software developers cannot predict the behavior 
of the battle-management software with confidence 
of system given the actual configuration of 
weapons, sensors, and battle managers are not 
known until the moment of battle.  3. Software 
developers cannot test the battle-management 
software under realistic conditions.  4. The 
duration of the defense engagement will be short. 
It will not allow for either human intervention 
or debugging the software to overcome software 
faults at runtime.  5. Battle-management software 
will have absolute real-time deadlines.  6. 
Battle-management software must integrate 
numerous dynamic software systems to the extent 
that has never before been achieved.  (Caffall, 
2005) 
It is clear that there is a direct relation between 
policy automation, the development of the battle manager 
and further development of the controlling software for a 
system of systems.  In Caffall’s work, the automated ROE 
policies are just a small function of the whole and the 
specific policies that will be housed exist in the ROE data 
store.  Automated ROE policy of the BM for a Generic 
Intercept System will be similar.  According to Caffall’s 
work, the “ROE data store contains the rules of engagement 
(ROEs) as set in the BMD planning phase to include shot 
doctrine, firing trigger (e.g., first available shot, 
Ninety percent probability of kill (PK), desired interceptor 
reserve)” (Caffall, 2005). In Figure 1, the ROE Data store 
is identified by the blue arrow, as it is a small portion 
of the Weapons Assignment System.   
 




In Dr. Caffall’s work, the command and control (C2) 
subsystem is the system that sets the parameters for the 
battle manager.  These parameters are, in essence, the 
policies that are discussed in this thesis.  Depending on 
the particular C2 subsystem, each battle manager will 
employ the appropriate C2 parameter or policies assigned to 
it.  He gave an example of a theater battle-manager being 
filled with rules of engagement policies that are specific 
to that theater but not applicable to the Homeland Battle 
Manager.  The ROE are defined for the theater battle 
manager must be transferred into that specific theater 
battle-manager and no others.  Caffall calls this process, 
the tailoring of a battle manager to its specific mission, 
in the BMD battlespace.   
Before moving forward with this discussion, it is 
important to understand what ROE are, how ROE will affect 
the battlespace, and why it is necessary for them to be 
automated.  
B. GENERAL ROE DISCUSSION 
1. What are Rules of Engagement? 
According to the Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, ROE is defined in the 
following manner: 
ROE are directives issued by competent military 
authority to delineate the circumstances and 
limitations under which its own naval, ground, 
and air forces will initiate and/or continue 
combat engagement with other forces encountered. 
They are the means by which the National Command 
Authority (NCA) and operational commanders 
regulate the use of armed force in the context of 
applicable political and military policy and 
domestic and international law. 
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Through the development of ROE, the President and 
National Command Authority (NCA) are able to meet national 
objectives.  ROE governs the military’s use of force to 
ensure that those objectives are met.  During peace and 
wartime, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) serve as the 
baseline for military personnel to follow.  They provide 
guidance, define the right to defend oneself, and act as 
the guidelines for the use of force.  Given this, 
commanders are alleviated of the need to request the use of 
force from the higher echelon of military and/or government 
leadership.  Based on world situations, however, these ROE 
may need to be altered.  Life does not fit neatly in a box, 
and ROE are most often changed due to operational 
situations that require different operational tactics.  The 
requirements, therefore, are that ROE remains consistent 
with national policy, military strategy, and the missions 
assigned by the higher authority.  In order to obtain a 
successful outcome, it is important that those that fall 
within the C2 structure strictly adhere to the rules of 
engagement set forth by the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).  
ROE will always recognize the inherent right of a unit 
or an individual’s self-defense.  ROE must be unambiguous 
and therefore must:  (1) fit the situation, (2) be reviewed 
for legal sufficiency and (3) be included in training.  
Rules of Engagement vary from operation to operation and 
often can vary midstream.  Generally, ROE provides guidance 
and imposes limitations on the use of force by commanders 
and individuals based on three primary considerations.  
These three considerations are legal, political, and 
military.   
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The legal considerations of ROE are set forth to 
affirm order and discipline during the facilitation of our 
governmental relationships and partnerships abroad.  Rules 
are only useful if everyone agrees to them; otherwise, they 
are nothing more than words.  Consequently, ROE are 
reflections of national policy and international and 
domestic law.   
Uniquely, political considerations drive the 
acceptance of missions and operations.  ROE must reflect 
the political will of the government.  A mission that lacks 
the general support of the people and their elected 
officials is doomed to failure.   
If legal considerations represent the mind of Rules of 
Engagement, political considerations would then represent 
the heart, and then military considerations would serve as 
the arm of ROE.  ROE help military personnel accomplish the 
mission by ensuring the use of force is executed in a 
manner consistent with the overall military objective.  In 
other words, it helps to keep the military on track and in 
focus.  It also must implement the inherent right of self-
defense.  ROE help prevent the unintended escalation of 
hostilities prior to achieving a desired readiness posture.  
This is achieved by developing an economy of force and 
preventing the destruction of enemy infrastructure that 
could prove important at a later date.   
It cannot be overstated how important it is to 
understand what ROE are and their impact to the ultimate 
success of operations; whether they be for BMD, an 
amphibious assault operation or even future non-kinetic 
cyber engagements.  Without the ROE, there is no regard for 
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ultimate war and complete destruction is the result. In 
essence, ROE keeps everything in order and on track. The 
ROE policies or parameters are the buffer between rational 
decisions and careless exchanges such as launching missiles 
with total disregard.   
C. ROE AUTOMATION IN MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. Why Automate ROE? 
When drafting and implementing ROE, it can be a very 
difficult endeavor; however, it is a critical issue when 
planning and executing various types of operations.  As 
stated earlier, in any operation ROE must be liberal enough 
to allow commanders operational flexibility while ensuring 
friendly forces stay within the mission’s legal, political, 
and operational boundaries.  When analyzing the necessity 
of automation, we look at the example and process of 
developing ROE.  There are a few issues that need to be 
taken into consideration.   
When drafting missile defense ROE, tension exists 
between operational efficiency and necessary constraints in 
ROE. This tension can be attributed to the proximity of 
civilians in the battlespace.  Careful consideration must 
be given to weapon system capabilities and C2 assets when 
crafting these ROE.  The degree of positive control of 
assets and surety of target identification that is both 
desirable and possible must be carefully considered.  In 
planning, ROE must be strictly cross-examined using 
possible and probable scenarios.   
When all of the planning and considerations are taken 
into account, we must consider a few essential points which 
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include but are not limited to the following general 
considerations. With operations conducted in the air, which 
will have a potential impact on urban environments that may 
be in proximity to missile defense operations, there exists 
the major concern of time.  Time constraints become a 
concern at the event identification and verification 
phases.  The sensor systems must, in a timely manner, make 
notifications to tactical assets and C2 platforms that 
possess the ability to assign the appropriate platform to 
handle the threat.  The weapons selection and its 
evaluation of its effectiveness against the particular 
threat is a concern as well.  The issue of time clearly is 
a major driving force for the automation of ROE policies.  
The ROE policies provide the decision points that are part 
of the identification of an event or threat, and lead to 
the ultimate decision to Kill or NOT.  In order to be 
effective, there is no time to delay at any point in this 
process as missile defense is not a zero sum game.  A 99 
percent success rate for the defender is still considered a 
failure, but a 99 percent failure rate for the attacker can 
still be considered a success, if only one of the launched 
missiles was a success.  A single enemy missile striking 
and destroying its target can have disastrous effects that 
can transcend the actual level of damage inflicted at the 
point of impact.   We must, therefore, be prepared for 
potential threats at a high level of defensive 
effectiveness.  This requires a well-planned and automated 
set of ROE policies.    
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III. POLICY AUTOMATION SYSTEM FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 
A. DISCUSSION OF APPLICABLE SYSTEMS 
1. Background  
In this section, it is important to understand policy 
automation from the perspective of systems in other 
domains.  What automated policy systems exist and what are 
their architectures?  We identify the benefits of using 
policy automation, and in particular, benefits from 
automated ROE policies.  We generally will ask: What does 
it look like? How do the components work and what are its 
interfaces?  In this pursuit of knowledge, we will discuss 
the Policy System proposed by Buibuish et al., as a 
automated policy solution for Net-Centric Warfare, the 
Policy Work Bench (PWB) and finally the proposed Generic 
Intercept System.  These systems show that automated 
policies are clearly possible.  Once we understand these 
systems, we will have a good reference point for the 
proposed uses of automated ROE policies and prelude the 
deeper discussion of how the policies will be automated and 
what that means for the BMD System and its structure.  As 
we look at an automated policy system, it is clear that the 
varying layers of interaction must be smooth and efficient 
in order for the outcome to be successful.   
At this point, we must move from one level of 
abstraction, the overarching, to the next level that delves 
further into the ROE unit itself.  We will also discuss 
policy automation and the tools that will be used to make 
this a reality.   
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We know what policies are from the previous section, 
but we have yet to evaluate what automation is, in order to 
make our foundation complete.  Automation is defined in the 
Encarta World English Dictionary as simply the replacement 
of human workers by technology.  This is the key reason for 
automation with regards to weapons, war and such 
engagements.  It must possess the capability to 
automatically make a decision and pass that decision on to 
the appropriate component or components.  This is the core 
of policy automation; the policies or constraints in the 
automated policy component must be automatic as its 
necessary feature and functionality.  
The idea for the automation of policies and automated 
aspects management in distributed components stems from the 
size and complexity of the distributed systems with which 
we deal with today.  However, every action has its own 
consequence and with the automation of distributed 
components comes loss of flexibility in some cases, as the 
only way to make changes to the behavior at that point is 
to recode.  One way to avoid this problem is to have a 
design that only requires the operator to revise the policy 
specifications files without recoding the policy automation 
engine. 
 In Table 1, we list the definitions and levels of 
automation as provided by Ensley and Kris (1995).  
 
Table 1.   Automation Table (From Ensley, 1995) 
 
2. Policy System 
The first policy system that we will be exploring is 
one that was proposed by Buibish, Lange and Woitalla in 
their paper titled, “Responsive Decision Making Through 
Automated Policy-Enabled Systems.”  They identified that 
policy systems, such as the one suggested, are necessary 
when one considers the military battlespace, an 
increasingly a more complex and dynamic policy environment.   
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After evaluating a very comprehensive scenario, it was 
clear to see that the policy system given this dynamic 
environment must be one that is flexible and adaptive.  It 
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must be automated, so that it will interpret and act on new 
relationships without having to make changes to the 
procedural logic of the system.  The appropriate action and 
response is a threat is the key.   
The system is a solution for automated policy for Net-
Centric Warfare.  The general policy architecture is 
provided in Figure 2.  The components include Domain 
Knowledge, Policy Console, Policy Broker/Expert system and 
a Policy Consumer.   
1. The Domain Knowledge is the component that allows 
the common operating picture to be presented.  It stores 
the problem space for the specific domain in which this 
policy system will interact.  They set the bases for the 
constraints that the Policy Console will operate within.  
The Policy Broker uses it to help determine applicable 
rules based defined relationships.   
2. The Policy Console is the initial human-to-computer 
interface with which the commander’s intent, in the form of 
policy rules, is translated for the system to upload for 
interface.   
3. The Policy Broker is the Expert System that acts as 
the repository for the policy rules that were uploaded via 
the Policy Console.  It will be the point at which the 
rules are verified and de-conflicted, or, at the very 
least, conflicts with rules are identified.   
4. The Policy Consumer can be a system or a human.  It 
is the aspect of the system or component that makes the 
request of the policy system based on the threat, action or 
response required.  When the Policy Consumer is an expert 
system, it allows for flexibility in decision making 
automatically adjusting to the changing domain knowledge.   
The proposed system and architecture is one that can 
be applied to various domains and could be chosen as the 
policy component for our Generic Intercept System (Buibish 
et al., 2005). 
 
 




3. Policy Workbench 
It is time to introduce the Policy Workbench (PWB), 
the idea of an architecture that was proposed by Sibley, 
Michael and Wexelblat.  The PWB is the tool that will be 
used to allow for policy automation within a system of 
systems such as is being proposed.  According to Michael et 
al., a policy workbench is an automated knowledge-based 
system comprised of a suite of tools designed to assist the 
user in the representation of policy; reasoning about the 
properties of policy such as consistency, completeness, 
soundness, and correctness; refinement of policy into 
systems; maintenance of policy; and enforcement of policy.  
There are five major actors and interfaces of the workbench 
as defined by Sibley et al., from which we have derived a 
version suitable for what the Battle Manager requires of 
its tactical and routine maintenance evaluation procedures.  
1. The policy maker enters policy by means of 
evaluation of current facts, figures, population and 
climate, which in turn provides a baseline for consistency 
when responding to ROE. 
2. The policy maintainer maintains live testing 
continuously to manage the cause and effect, as well as 
correctness and completeness in the means of protection. 
Because of the live updates, it is modified accordingly in 
order to maintain accuracy and soundness within the system. 
3. The policy implementer is a responsible unit that 
is designed to act as a ROE facilitator that both 
interprets and disperses ROE effectively, while maintaining 
an accurate tracking of all inter-relations amongst 
policies. 
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4. The policy enforcer is responsible for maintaining 
an efficient procedure that will enable ROE to be 
maintained and fulfilled. 
5. The policy evaluator routinely runs checks-and- 
balances through various queries, data analysis and 
strategic implementation procedures. 
As seen in Figure 3, there are three important 
subsystems of the PWB.  They are the Policy and Real World 
Analyzer, the Dictionary Handler System and the Reasoning 
System.  In Sibley’s early work, both the Policy and Real 
World Analyzer and the Dictionary Handler System consist of 
a Lexical Analyzer (LA), an important aspect as we have yet 
to discuss how the policies will get into the system from 
the User interface.  When policies are input, they will go 
through the LA which accepts policy statements and 
translates them into a common data interchange format based 
on an Object Oriented Model.  This aspect is a key point 
when developing and using automated policies.  The policies 
are in most cases going to be created by someone other than 
the programmer, who will not speak the computer language.  
In order for full automation to be accomplished, the 
policies, whether they are ROE or other, will need to be 
translated from the common spoken language to computer 
language and back again.  This is the function of the LA.  
More work is being done in the realm of Natural Language 
processing support, but we will shelve that discussion for 
now.  The dictionary handling system acts as a database; it 
will organize, store and be the point of refinement for the 
policies.  The triggers of the dictionary system allows for 
the update of its schema to signal any needed changes to 
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other components.  With a fully populated Dictionary, the 
Reasoning System will evaluate queries to answer questions 
such as: “what level of refinement is necessary to enable 
effective future processing of policies?” and “what 
reasoning techniques will best allow for standard and 
important policy queries and must be used to respond to a 
request for information or a specific query?” 
Three mechanisms we must also address, which are part 
of the PWB, based on prior studies, are the automated 
theorem prover; an expert system having forward and 
backward chaining capabilities; and an object-oriented 
system, incorporating, at least, the ability to specify 
multiple inheritances and message passing between objects.   
Based on the research of this work, the PWB has proven 
to be the logical choice when considering the need of the 
intercept system to have automated policies.  The 
workbench’s flexibility will allow any type of policies to 
be stored.  With the internal function of checking for 
correctness and completeness in the policy, it makes it 
ideal for the automated ROE policies.     
 Policy and Real 
World Analyzer 

















Policy and Real 
World Analyzer 
Figure 3.   Policy Workbench (From Sibley et al.,1992) 
 
4. Generic Intercept System    
The architecture of an intercept system will hold the 
same general characteristics of the systems described 
earlier. It is a distributed system, as previously defined. 
When we began to develop the model, we used one with which 
we were familiar.  In studying the Rapid Action Surface-to-
Air Missile (RASAM) System, it gives us a baseline model to 
which to refer with the creation of our GENERIC INTERCEPT 
SYSTEM (Michael, 2006). 
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The generic intercept system architecture is a 
software intensive system that is made up of three primary 
subsystems; the Weapons Deployment subsystem, the Weapon 
and the Battle Manager (Figure 4).  Supplementary equipment 
that could be associated with this system is the loader, 
weapons deployment interface test kit and the weapon 
interface test kit.   
The Battle Manager is the primary component of the 
intercept system.  The BM interfaces with the host Command 
and Control (C2) system.  The type of C2 will vary 
depending upon the operation environment or domain. The 
type of intercept system that would be attached to a ship 
for missile intercept, the C2 may even vary by class of 
ship.  The BM will accept target designations and 
engagement orders from the C2 system.  It will also issue 
commands to the weapons deployment subsystem via the most 
expeditious means of communication, such as Satellite, 
Fiber-Optic cable, wireless capabilities or others as 
available.  
Major subsystems of the battle manager are the 
Interface Connector Panel (ICP), which is the primary point 
for all interfacing.  It is the switch board for the Battle 
manager taking requests and passing along the appropriate 
data to the right components within the system. It 
interfaces with the software of the host combat system, and 
the sensors, internal and external to the host.  This idea 
of a host will remain generic and vary based on environment 
or domain.  The ICP will interface between the BM for 
execution of actions as prescribed by the Rules of 
Engagement Unit (ROEU). Another function of the ICP is that 
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it will format message traffic for the Control Unit (CU).  
The CU and the ROEU represent the remaining major 
subsystems of this system.  The CU is where the operator 
interface happens, and will, for most systems, be a Graphic 
User Interface (GUI). At this panel the operator can select 
the operational mode (e.g., Off, Standby, Test, Training or 
Tactical), view and input data.  It is where the operator 
can monitor the operation of the systems similar to that of 
the task manager in today’s personal computer.  The ICP 
will also interface between the BM for execution of actions 
as prescribed by the ROEU.  As for the ROEU, this is where 
our automated ROE policies are housed. This is the 
equivalent to Dr Caffall’s ROE Data Store. This unit will 
have interface with the CU and the ICP on the lower 
subsystem level but will also have an interface with the 
Battle Manager directly.  The ROEU will be the decision-
making hub through which the output will produce a decision 
to “Shoot,” “Don’t Shoot,” or “Wait, based on its various 
interfaces, the knowledge base or policy repository.  Once 
the output data is processed from the ROEU, it will pass it 
to the BM to carry out the actual engagement or intercept 
again depending on environment.   
The intercept systems’ other main leg is the 
Launcher/Deployment Subsystem, which will also constitute a 
major subsystem.  The Launcher is the unit where the tools 
or weapon is housed.  It is also responsible for the 
positioning of the weapon for a successful engagement.  The 
Launcher, in this case, can be a ship, a standalone weapons 
system, a CPU (in the case a cyber engagement), or whatever 










IV. THE ROE UNIT OF THE BATTLE MANAGER 
A. BACKGROUND 
As shown in the Generic Intercept System architecture, 
it is clear that the ROE Unit is the primary component of 
the Battle Manger for the suggested Ballistic Missile 
Defense system.  As we have explored the two policy systems 
and further suggested the architecture for a Generic 
Intercept System, we must choose the policy system that 
will support the architecture for our ROE Unit. In this 
section, we have chosen the policy system and will be 
presenting a design that will allow for the development of 
the ROE Unit for our Battle Manger. 
The first step in designing the ROE Unit for the 
Battle Manager is to perform a use case analysis to 
identify the actor and features of the proposed software.  
The second step in designing the ROE Unit for the Battle 
Manger is to choose the policy system, for which we have 
chosen the general policy architecture as presented by 
Buibish et al., 2005. In choosing this system, we must next 
develop two key elements needed for its functionality: 1) 
the Domain Knowledge, which will be realized by the 
creation of an ontology for the domain of Missile Defense; 
and, 2) the development of rules for the Expert System, 
which will be compatible with a Policy model that we will 
also select.     
For the ontology development, we will explore the 
existing ontologies of Sensors, Weapons and Command and 
Control Systems (C2).  Much of this work has been 
researched and created independently.  We will show 
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examples of these ontologies.  We will show the ROE 
policies that we have created of which will be translated 
into our rules.  In order to understand what the domain 
will consist of and the interfaces associated with the 
system, we examine a general set of Missile Defense 
scenarios which we will use to develop use case and 
activity diagrams.  These diagrams and analysis products 
give us greater insight into the domain of Missile Defense.    
Before we get into the use case analysis and the 
development of the key elements of our ROEU, this next 
section will present the proposed architecture for the 
ROEU.  
B. ARCHITECTURE 
In this section we will recall the architectural 
models provided for both the Policy system in Figure 2 and 
the Generic Intercept System in Figure 4.  Our Generic 
Intercept system was a black box view, in other words we 
could not see the internal component of that Unit.  We have 
to reconcile with each model the components that will be 
reused or modified to ensure compatibility and then show 
what that architecture will look like as the ROE Unit.   
As we study the architecture presented by Buibish et 
al., 2005, we see the key components include the Policy 
Console, which is the user interface, the Domain Knowledge 
(ontology), the Expert System that consists of the Rule 
Base and Inference Engine, and the Policy Consumer, which 
is the component that makes requests of the rules. 
The Generic Intercept Systems architecture again shows 
a black box view of the ROE Unit that interfaces with the 
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Interface Connector Panel (ICP), which is responsible for 
all interacting with internal and external consumers of the 
system to include the Host Combat systems, the Sensors and 
even the C2 systems.  The ICP is responsible for formatting 
the requests of the external systems, as well as internal 
components in a manner that the ROE Unit or Policy system 
can understand.  The other component to address that 
interacts with the ROE Unit is the Control Unit (CU). It 
acts as the user interface with a GUI much like the Policy 
Console.    
Figure 5 presents the architecture for the ROE Unit, 
which takes into account the functionality of both 
architectures in a manner in which we don’t lose the 
integrity of the systems, their necessary interfaces or 
operations.  The ROEU has two internal components, the 
Expert System, which consists of the Rule Base and 
Inference Engine.  This Expert System allows flexibility, 
since decisions can automatically adjust to the changing 
domain knowledge. The second component is the Domain 
Knowledge, which is used to relate rules to the request 
criteria.  The request or data must fit within the 
knowledge of the environment or be added to that domain 
knowledge.   Both the Expert System and the Domain 
Knowledge components communicate with the ICP.  It will 
take a request for a given set of criteria and provide a 
response action.  This communication is all automated 
between software.  The CU is the interface with the 
Operator or the User where it can operate, monitor and 
interact with the system in all modes of operations.  The 
CU will normally interface with the ICP in order to pass 
and receive information, but in the case of maintenance 
trouble shooting or testing, the CU will communicate 
directly with the ROEU’s Expert System and Domain Knowledge 
via a secondary communication path, as reflected by the 
dotted lines.  This is a precautionary means of 
communicating with the ROEU.     
 
 
Figure 5.   ROE Unit 
 
C. USE CASE ANALYSIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES 
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In this section, we will look at the elements needed 
to derive our rules for the Expert System.  The foundation 
of the rule development comes from a holistic understanding 
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of the domain or environment, the Commanders Intent, the 
system itself, and the components internally and externally 
that interact with this system.  We examine a general set 
of scenarios from which we develop our use case and 
activity diagrams.   
The production of these diagrams will yield a general 
set of ROE policies, constraints, Commanders concerns, or 
intent.  These rules need to be understood clearly in order 
to proceed with the appropriate action.  It is from this 
ROE set and the adaption of the policy model that we will 
create a few sample Rules that our system will be able to 
process.     
1. High Level System Use Case Analysis  
Development of general scenarios based on discussions 
with individuals that work in the realm of Ballistic 
Missile defense is paramount in developing use cases.  The 
scenarios help us also create rules of engagement as we 
understand what actions and interfaces the system will be 
involved in. The readers will see from the activity 
diagrams covered in the next section how these rules will 
be derived.  All Rules of Engagement policies are derived 
from scenarios and situations that extend beyond those 
covered by the CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement.  The 
scenarios for use case analysis help show the basic 
operations of the system and help define the interfaces 
with the system.  This is one of the primary purposes of 
use case analysis.    
The scenarios chosen are used to understand the 
environment in which the Generic Intercept System and the 
ROE Unit will operate in.  Many scenarios are derived from 
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experience and at this time we do not have any to glean 
from.  With that being the case, we have chosen simple 
scenarios centered on the premise that actions are 
imminent.  What can be further identified in this section 
is that the scenarios drive the use cases, but likewise in 
evaluating the use cases, we can derive new scenarios as it 
allows us to ask a series of ‘what if’ questions of the 
system interfaces that will allow for greater discussion 
and understanding of the system.   
 Figure 6.   Intercept System Use Case 
 
The primary actors that we have identified in this 
first iteration of the use case analysis for the high level 
system are the sensors, the user (or C2 platform) and the 
weapons system.  With each of the listed scenarios, there 
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are specific concerns that each actor has to take into 
consideration.  There can be more actors given a specific 
situation, but these three are our focus for the limited 
scope of the scenarios provided.   
2. Use Case for ROE Unit 
We now create a use case that specifically identifies 
the interfaces of the ROE Unit using the same set of 
scenarios but adding more detail to best flush out the 
actors, the interfaces and the actions of the system.  This 
level of refinement will help in the design of the ROEU.     
In this scenario, the sensor identifies a ballistic 
missile. The sensor is an infrared equipped sensor that 
detects the heat signature.  The data is instantly received 
by the generic intercept system alerting the User via the 
GUI and the Intercept Control Panel, which will communicate 
this data received to the ROEU to determine that the 
information is in the Domain Knowledge and to the Expert 
System if so to determine base on the rule inference what 
action can be taken.  The system will be receiving 
information steadily as the event is still in an active 
mode.  The validation of the information and a 
determination of actions have been identified sent to the 
ICP and the CU for review.  Once the actions are 
determined, the ICP will communicate with the Host Combats 
System or appropriate C2 platform to execute actions.  The 
message sent will have all coordinates, weapons information 
and execute considerations as flagged by the ROEU.   
Information that is of a higher classification than the 
platform being assigned the task will be further flagged or 
stripped.  
The use cases shown in Figure 7 review the key actors 





























Figure 7.   Use Case for ROEU 
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As we analyze the uses cases for the ROEU, we see that 
the actors interface with the system to execute seven 
different actions. These are as follows. 
 1) Store Domain Knowledge: Both actors will interface 
with the system in order to load or store the ontology for 
the domain into the ROEU in particular the Domain Knowledge 
component. It is under that instance of maintenance, 
testing or as a backup to adding to the ontology that the 
CU will interface with the ROEU for this action.  
2) Requests Rules: Both actors will again make rule 
requests of the Expert System however in the case of the CU 
it will not be the primary interface for this action.   
3) Inputs Rules: The ICP and the CU will interact with 
the system in order to input rules into the Rule Base of 
the Expert System.  
4) Defines and Differentiates relationships: As the 
data is initiated or requested by the ICP, the systems will 
determine where in the ontology it fits and then determine 
a relationship to help best differentiate the rules and 
response actions that are most suitable.   
5) Query and Input Domain Knowledge: Both the CU and 
the ICP will need to input and query the domain knowledge. 
In this case, the ontology will be queried.  
6) Identify Conflicts: a primary function of an 
automated system is that it will allow for the 
identification of conflict as the ICP interfaces with the 
ROEU, for example, when the data received is in conflict 
with the knowledge about the domain.   
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7) Validate and verify classification of data: In this 
case, data is passed to the ICP and interfaces with the 
ROEU.  If the response action requires passing data that 
may be of a level of classification greater than that of 
the C2 element then that information will need to be 
flagged and or striped. 
3. Deriving Rules for Expert System 
The general flow of action for our scenarios within 
this domain follows. 1) Sensors or other indications and 
warning systems identify a threat.  This information is 
automatically uploaded to the intercept system.  2) The 
intercept system will process all the information checking 
and evaluating data received.  3) The system will make a 
determination based on the data received, information 
existing in systems database, and repositories.  4) That 
information will be passed along to the designated asset 
that will accomplish the desired effect, which, in the case 
of an intercept system, is to shoot or not to shoot.  The 
set of rules or constraints are consistent with the ROE 
policies for the particular domain given all of the 
information that is known at the present time or otherwise 
at the time of ROE policies creation.     





The flow of each scenario, again, is generally the 
same as the one shown in Figure 8, which begins with the 
identification of an event.  The sensors are the primary 
source of indications and warning.  In this case, there can 
be various types of sensors on multiple platforms, but for 
purposes of this work we, again, are being very general.  
At this point we see the flow as 1) user is informed of the 
situation to the millisecond; 2) user monitors the system 
as it runs through the policies and processes of 
determining the credibility of the threat; 3) the ROE unit 
determines whether to shoot based on the credibility of the 
threat; based on weapon system(s) capability, 4) the ROE 
unit then assigns the weapon system(s) with the 
responsibility to execute, as appropriate.  The 
communication between all actors and the system must be 
clear and concise, as time is a critical factor in matters 
of missile defense.  If a weapons system does not 
successfully execute and destroy the target, another may be 
required to execute but alludes to the fact that the 
sensors will be tracking and communicating as the event 
continues.  This is the general flow to consider for the 
four scenarios below all have the same desired outcome of 
100 percent destruction of all threats prior to entering a 
point in the U.S. that could cause any effect.   
1. Multiple Warheads with Saber Rattling 
All sensors are tuned to particular areas of the world 
based on known and expected tensions.  The assets that 
would react to the threat of missile attack are ready and 
positioned to do so; these are known as Defense Assets.  
The Order of Battle for the stated enemy is known.  The 
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origin and firing point of the missile will not be a 
surprise, but the type of missile and firing time are still 
relevant questions, and the location and time of impact are 
important to calculate. 
2. Multiple Warheads with No Prescience 
A sensor detects the launch of multiple missiles or 
deployment of multiple weapons systems.  The communications 
link must be open for C2 to ensure verification of missile 
launch, coordinates, type, and time, among other data.  In 
this case, the assignment of the most appropriate asset 
must be selected and notified in the most expeditious 
manner.   
3. Detection of Unidentified Weapon or Missile 
Sensors and or intelligence have detected a missile or 
intercept event.  The weapon is not identified, but the 
data that is provided includes time and coordinates for the 
missile or weapons system data.  Through continued 
tracking, we obtain the speed, coordinates and other 
important data updates.   
4. Detection of a Non-Threat Event   
The system and its sensors determine that there is a 
launch or trigger event, but with additional intelligence, 
a determination is made that the event is a Non-Threat 
event.   
a. Proposed ROE Policies 
Listed in this section, the readers will find a 
set of policies that were derived from the scenarios.  The 
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policies would be run through an appropriately configured 
system for correctness and completeness.  The assumption is 
that when the BM is in tactical mode, it is ready to shoot.  
The policies are the constraints of the system or 
parameters that will or will not let the automated ROE 
policy unit produce a result that will forward instructions 
to the BM to shoot or otherwise engage.  Before we show the 
policies, it is important to see how from the scenarios the 
policies are derived.  Using the first scenario as an 
example, we see that there are many factors that are known 
like general location of the threat, assuming all 
intelligence assessments are correct, we should be able to 
determine that easily.  Consideration of this naturally 
falls within the ROE; the actor shooting and their location 
will determine how and if we can act in response.  This is 
ROE: constraints that allow us to conduct warfare in the 
best possible manner. The second scenario brings into 
question the constraint of action based on unclear 
information due to a possible lack of communication.  In 
general, it would be irresponsible to risk so much as 
shooting a missile at a target that may or may not be 
validated.  With regards to our third scenario, it is 
clearly a question of weapons selection. If the target 
specifics are unknown the operator may chose a weapon that 
may not be effective.  We must consider measures of 
effectiveness, as well as measures of performance concerns.  
Did we hit our target and how well we did?  Will we be able 
to execute intercept with an appropriate weapons system in 
the right window of engagement?  Finally, in the last 
scenario, we have a situation in which the sensors are 
reporting one thing, yet the supporting intelligence is 
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reporting something different.  This would be a situation 
when the operator would want to consider the source of the 
data before shooting.  Again, through this scenario, it 
helps identify constraints or things that the commander may 
need to consider before taking action.  We must remember 
that there are Standing ROE, we have to come up with ad hoc 
ROE based on the commander, or situation, which in this 
case is specifically missile defense. 
Policy 1) Shoot if there is data intercept information 
from three sources,  
Policy 1b) Shoot if you have data intercept 
information from two sources and an approved insufficient 
source count override by an authorized operator.   
Policy 2) Shoot if there is tracking data for moving 
engagements such as missiles that are identified as a 
threat; we must obtain coordinates, time, speed, and weapon 
system type.   
Policy 3) Shoot if engagement is within preset window 
of engagement.  Lat/Longs for all areas will be stored in 
the database list.  If the engagement takes place outside 
of the appropriate window, there may be grave consequences 
to consider, such as the loss of life if engaged over 
highly populated areas or environmental issues.   
Policy 4) Shoot if engagement window will be a 
determinant distance outside of foreign airspace or 
territory other than enemy territory.  E.g., 300 Mile 
outside. 
Policy 5) Shoot if location or tracking data has been 
validated.   
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Policy 6) Shoot if domain knowledge or system 
knowledge database has been updated or refreshed within 10 
days.  This is necessary when taking into consideration 
enemy Order of Battle (OOB) and weapons inventory.  
Different operating battlespaces may have a high 
operational tempo and 10 days may have to be reduced to 1 
or 2 for a refresh.   
Policy 7) Shoot if interceptor calculations reflect a 
chance of success at 80 percent or greater.     
Policy 8) Shoot if the identified weapon is exhibiting 
the normal capabilities, speed, flight pattern, etc., as 
defined by domain knowledge.   
Policy 9) Shoot if you can identify threat or if a 
non-threat event is determined threat event.   
Policy 10) Shoot if higher echelon leadership does not 
override system.  E.g. in the case that the engagement is 
being handled in U.S. Pacific Command, the Secretary of 
Defense can override.   
As it is clearly understood, ROE are limitations and 
circumstances delineated by higher authorities that govern 
the decision making of forces initiating and prosecuting 
combat engagements with enemy forces.  The environment in 
which the engagement is to take place will determine what 
the specific ROE will be.  Build further on the idea to 
predict the scenarios that could be realized, and then 
determine what ROE policies should be created and added to 
the knowledge base of the system. 
Policies are developed by a collaborative effort.  
When you look at a scenario, you can determine what the 
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concerns are and derive the appropriate policies.  The 
hands involved in policy-creation include, but are not 
limited to, those of the President, Secretary of Defense, 
Combatant Commands (COCOMS), and lawyers and, in the case 
of automated policies, the system maintainer who will be 
loading these policies.  Before we move further, we must 
briefly address the research on Natural Language Processing 
support. Michael, Ong, and Rowe propose the use of the 
natural language to interact with the PWB.  The foundation 
behind this idea is that the people creating the policies 
are not going to be computer scientists, but rather 
politicians, military and other civilians.  This system 
must be able to take inputs that are close to modern 
English and push it to the repository translated into 
computer language for interface with the system.  This is 
where the backward and forward chaining is vital to the 
system.   
4. A Policy Model 
We have selected a policy model that uses general 
terminology, which will enable policies, ideas, and data 
that will be used in the military domain (Buibish, 2005).  
It is important to use this particular model as many others 
were created for domains, such as networking where the 
terminology is not compatible.  The key elements of this 
model are the Policy Rule, the Policy Condition and the 
Policy Actions (Figure 9).  The Policy Rule is where the 
data that defines how the Policy Rule is used in a 
environment, as well as, a specification of behavior that 
dictates how the managed entities that it applies to will 
interact.  The Policy Condition will define the necessary 
state and/or prerequisites that define whether the 
associated Policy Actions should be performed.  The Policy 
Action is where the necessary action that should be 
performed if the Policy Condition is met is represented.  
Figure 13 shows our model and it will be from this form and 
function that our rules, which will be presented in our 
example, have to fit.      
 
Figure 9.   Policy Model Primary Classes  
(From Strassner, 2004) 
 
a. Example of Policy Model for ROE Unit 
The Policy model is important to the ROEU, as it 
is how the rules will be formatted for the Expert System.  
In order for the Expert System to understand the Commanders 
Intent or the ROE policies, it will need to be reflected in 
a manner in which the system can identify.  As we have 
chosen the policy model reflected in Figure 9, we now 
provide a set of sample rules.  This will be in a format 
that can be used for any relational database or Object 
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Oriented Database.  Table 2 provides an example of the 
rules that are derived from the ROE polices.  
Policy Rules Policy Condition Policy Action 
1)   Three sources provide 
intercept data.  
Shoot 
1b) No override submitted in 




2) coordinates, time, speed, 
and weapon system type 
exist for moving engagement 
Shoot 
Table 2.   Sample Rules for ROEU 
 
D. UNDERSTANDING DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE USING AN ONTOLOGY 
We must begin this section by defining what an 
ontology is. Gruber defines ontology as an explicit formal 
specification of terms in the domain and relations among 
them (1993). In general, ontologies help you understand an 
environment or specific domain with better clarity as it 
lays out also a common vernacular for all that are 
interested in research with that domain to understand.  
Noy, et al. gives five specific reasons for developing 
ontologies: 1) This will allow for the sharing of a common 
understanding of the structure of information among people 
or software agents. 2) To enable reuse of domain knowledge. 
3) It will allow you to make domain assumptions explicit.   
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4) It will allow you to separate domain knowledge from 
the operational knowledge.  5) It allows you to analyze 
domain knowledge.   
When we look at the ontology for the missile defense 
domain, we understand that this should be a composite of 
the information known about the domain.  In the most 
general look at such a missile defense ontology, we focus 
on three key elements; Sensors, Weapons, and C2.  In the 
next three sections, you will see examples of ontologies 
that have been created for each of these individual 
domains.  Portions of these ontologies will be used in the 
development of our proposed Missile Defense Ontology later 
in this chapter.       
1. Ontology for Sensor Domain 
The first example of an ontology in the sensor domain 
was provided in the undergraduate work titled Ontology 
Development as Undergraduate Research by Antonio Lopez, Jr.  
His work gives examples of ontologies and identifies why 
they are suited for undergraduate research.  This ontology 
presented is a partial sensor ontology that focuses on the 
Thermal Infrared Multi-spectral Scanner (TIMS), which is an 
instance of an infrared device that is a kind of (ako) 
sensor (Figure 10).  The nodes sensor and platforms both 
have many features and subsystems.  There are two kinds of 
sensors, radar and infrared and various types of platforms 
including aerial, land-based and space-based.  This is a 
simple sensor ontology that can be used to build out the 
complete sensor domain (Lopez, 2002). 
 
Figure 10.   Partial Sensor domain ontology (From Lopez, 
2002) 
 
In Figure 11, we present another example of a sensor 
ontology developed by Davis.  In this case, we see a 
different orientation of the nodes reflecting a bottom up 
approach to understanding the relationships within the 
domain.  Note, that in the case of radar, the author 
further built out its relationship to include an instance 
of radar being the x band type of radar.  Davis even 
identifies the signals that are emitted from the radar in 
this case the electromagnetic wave that is further 
identified as a sub-class of the electromagnetic signal.  
This sensor ontology covers the aspects of the sensor 
domain that would be of most importance with respect to 




Figure 11.   Partial Sensor Ontology (From Davis,2004) 
 
As illustrated by the previous two examples, there are 
many approaches to developing an ontology for sensors. 
Depending on the context in which the researchers are 
looking at the problem, two researchers can independently 
develop two different ontologies for the same domain. In 
general, it is clear to see that the full development of a 
sensor ontology would be a very challenging and labor-
intensive task, as we would need to identify the reason for 
the domain knowledge in order to relate the different 
sensor information. 
2. Weapons Related Ontology 
In the example below, Andrade and Brandsma present an 
example of an ontology that will be part of their future 
development of a semantic enabled orchestration in support 
of Ballistic Missile Defense System contexts. What we take 
from this example is the beginning of the Missile 
relationships and how they relate to Missile Defense.  In 
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his example, the Missile has a type in which one is the 
ICBM (Figure 12).  It shows us that, with regard to Missile 
Defense, two key functions are the Missile’s Signature and 
its Type.  This will be the starting point for our sample 
Missile Defense Ontology.    
 
Figure 12.   Remake of Semantic-Enabled Orchestration 
(From Andrade,2007) 
 
3. C2 Related Ontology 
Currently, a published C2 Domain Ontology does not 
exist to date, but Ms. Leslie Winters, U.S Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM) and Dr. Andreas Tolk, of Old Dominion 
University, have presented a number of very viable reasons 
for such an ontology, as well as steps to realizing it with 
the work presented in the paper titled “C2 Domain Ontology 
In Our Lifetime” (Winters, 2009).  
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For the purposes of this work, we will suggest a 
partial C2 ontology that will be associated with our 
Missile Defense Ontology example.  As shown in Figure 13, 
the C2 elements begin with the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) who delegates to the subordinate COCOM.  The types 
of Missile Defense Platforms are further subordinate to the 
COCOMS.  In the case of the Nuclear Powered Ballistic 
Missile Submarine (SSBN), you see that it is a kind of 
subsurface platform, and one instance of SSBN is SSBN 43, a 
specific boat.  There are many layers of C2 missing from 
this example, but a simplistic view allows readers to 
understand what the C2 domain ontology would consist of.    
 
Figure 13.   Sample C2 Domain Ontology 
 
These sample ontologies give a better understanding of 
the complexity that we face when we consider a missile 
defense domain ontology will be inclusive of all three of 
these domains.  It is also clear that more work will need 
to be done on the individual development of these 
ontologies but at this time we will use them as a 
foundation to build from, and they are reflected in the 
next section.    
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4. Sample Ontology for Missile Defense Domain 
One of the more subjective portions of designing a 
ROEU is developing the Missile Defense Domain Ontology.  
Based on our use case analysis, we determine that there are 
three primary actors: the Sensors, the Missiles or Weapons 
and the C2.  As stated earlier, an ontology consists of the 
relationships and knowledge about a particular domain.  In 
this section, we will provide a sample Missile Defense 
Ontology that will be stored as the Domain Knowledge for 
the ROEU.  The Domain Knowledge is necessary when one 
considers how things such as the requests levied on the 




























5. Example of a Threat Engagement by ROEU  
To understand how the sample ontology in Figure 14 and 
the rules in Table 2 are used by the ROEU, consider the 
scenario in which the Radar identifies or detects a Threat 
Signature; this signature is associated with a particular 
Threat Weapon and further associated with a particular 
Threat Country.  We see that the sensor is on the 
subsurface platforms, which are equipped with, or carry 
Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). At this 
time, the specific submarine that could be assigned to 
respond is the SSBN 43.  It is particularly important to 
note that the weapons system that has a range to action 
against the particular Threat Country is the 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).  Using this 
ontology, the Expert System will have to identify that 
there are no missiles that are in the domain knowledge that 
can respond to the threat, or we will have to reflect that 
the SLBM has the range to action against the threat.  While 
this is going on, the system itself is running all of the 
data through the Expert System’s Rule Base and Inference 
Engine to ensure we can execute and that it is in 
accordance with the ROE of missile defense for example 
Policy 1 needs to be met where three sources are tracking 
the threat.      
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, what we derive from this chapter is a 
design for the ROEU.  We have taken the time to propose an 
architecture that will best suit the adaptation of the 
architectures for the generic intercept system and the 
policy system that we have chosen.  We then used the use 
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case analysis to understand the high-level software 
features of the system and conducted use case analysis to 
do the same for the ROE Unit specifically. We have 
discussed the scenarios used for this operation, as well as 
how those scenarios are used to develop ROE policies that 
were subsequently used to become the rules for the Expert 
System. We ensured that the rules where compatible with the 
Policy model that was chosen.  Once we had our Rules, we 
then explored the Domain Knowledge by understanding 
ontology and presenting a sample ontology for the missile 
defense domain.  
Now, by seeing this proposed design for the ROEU, we 
see that the Domain Knowledge requires an ontology of the 
domain space and that ontology will be called upon to 


















V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVISITING THE ISSUES 
The need for a Ballistic Missile Defense system 
exists.  This system, as a result of the domain, as well as 
the threats and actors associated with such threats, needs 
to be able to appropriately respond with the greatest level 
of accuracy, expedience and reliability.  The framework for 
such a system must be one that has enabled automated ROE 
policies.   
We have expressed through this work the importance 
that Rules of Engagement (ROE) play in the engagement of 
targets no matter what the situation.  When looking at 
today’s technology, the changing battlespace and the 
weapons systems that are in existence, full automation is 
required, and with full automation, any intercept system 
must be enabled with automated ROE policies as a component 
in its Battle Manager. 
To realize and design this ROEU for the BM, we were 
able to explore and select a policy system that would allow 
the functionally required to accomplish the desired effect 
of Missile Defense. With the proposed architecture, we see 
its key component being the Expert System, which again 
includes the Rule Base and Inference Engine, and the Domain 
Knowledge.  Key features of this work was the outline of 
the systems functions as defined using use case analysis to 
show what the system will do and the actor that interface 
with the system.  We then presented examples of the key 
elements of the Expert System and Domain Knowledge, which  
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is represented by the Sample Missile Defense Domain 
Ontology, and the development of the sample rules for the 
system.    
The remainder of this section is devoted to briefly 
reflecting on some ideas of future research areas with 
regards to the ideas covered with this body of work.    
B. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROE UNIT 
1. Functional Requirements 
Functional Requirements simply relay the specific 
functionality that defines what we desire the unit or 
system to accomplish.  Listed below are a general set of 
Functional Requirements.  These will need to be further 
refined as a result of more extensive use case analysis and 
further design and testing of the proposed ROE Unit.   
A. The unit shall display and differentiate data and 
rules as established by the domain.    
B. The unit shall evaluate its behavior at the 
update of new data that may change the battlespace 
picture.  New data may come from weapons, sensor, the 
battle manager itself, or even User-made injects.    
C. The unit shall accept in test mode injects that 
present as realistic a view of the battlespace as 
possible.   
D. The unit shall display and notify User 
immediately of software faults at runtime.   
E. The unit shall provide a User with diagnostic 
presentation in test mode and operational mode.    
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F. The unit shall allow a User or maintainer to add, 
delete, or modify data, in particular the Rule of 
Engagement policies.    
G. The unit shall be compatible, integrating 
numerous dynamic software systems, based on its 
various interfaces.  
H. The unit shall have the capability to perform 
backward and forward chaining.  
2. Non-functional Requirements 
Non-functional requirements define how a system is 
supposed to be. Non-functional requirements are also 
considered the qualities or constraints of the system being 
created.  These too would need to be further refined as the 
software development processes on this system evolves.   
A. Utility 
  1. The training program and manual must be 
extensive but designed for all levels of users to become 
proficient at operating all aspects of the system.   
 2. The Graphic User Interface (GUI) must be 
user friendly and meet all Human Computer Interface (HCI) 
standards (Bevan, 1995). There must be no confusion as to 
the most important displays, buttons or how to navigate and 
maneuver.   
 3. All symbols and displays will need to be 






1. The unit shall have highest priority with 
all communication sources.  In operational mode, no 
connectivity will take priority over data transfer to 
and from the system.   
2.  Maintainers and maintenance of systems must 
be available for 24/7 support. 
3. One hundred percent accuracy is necessary 
for all transmissions validity.   
4. One hundred percent of all messages will 
need to report transmission success or transmission 
failure.   
C.  Performance 
 1. The unit shall have absolute run time 
deadlines. 
  2. The unit will have the highest level of 
processing capability as to allow for the processing of 
massive amounts of simultaneous data transfer without the 
system getting hung processes. 
 3. The unit’s database capacity must be large 
enough that if it reached critical size, it would not stop 
processing, but rather, would pop the data from the stack 
into an external repository.   
D. Interfaces 
 1. The components of the unit must be scalable 
as it evolves and grows interfaces must not be affected.  
This is a system of systems, and as such will interact with 
weapons systems, navigation systems and sensors.       
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E. Legal 
1. The loaded and stored ROE policies in ass 
part of the domain knowledge must reflect national 
policy and international and domestic law. They will 
need to be approved by the appropriate COCOM’s in 
compliance with Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions and 
guidance.   
F.  Security 
 1. The minimum required clearance level for the 
system is SECRET.  This may vary depending on the 
environment and the test of targets or the approved ROE 
stored in the ROCU.   
 2. A minimum of SECRET-level security clearance 
will be required for all personnel who work on the 
development of this system and the associated Rules of 
engagement.    
C. FUTURE WORK 
Many follow-on topics are available in ROE automation 
including, but not limited to, the following topics: 
1) Develop a complete ontology for Missile Defense 
domain.  
2) Refine the rules for the Expert System.  
3) Further architecture discussion as automated 
policies can be used in various domains.  Some of 
those domains may be non-kinetic and require 
different interfaces and as such different 
requirements. What domains or environments can 
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actually benefit from policy automation systems 
and in particular, ROE policy automation? 
4) Identify platforms will handle such a system of 
systems and explore their compatibility.   
5) What is the level of knowledge and training 
programs for such a system?     
6) How would you use and automate policy systems in 
Computer Network Operations?   
7) Creation of the security portion of the system as 
some components may have multiple levels of 
security.  
8) How can one maintain and test such a system? 
9) Will the system support a rapidly changing 
environment?  How many different threats can the 
system process? 
10) Reliability studies to determine a level of 
confidence in the accuracy of the system.  
11) Deconfliction of the policies and rules within 
the system.  Will that be by the system itself or 
a maintainer?  Does the technology exist for the 
system to identify and correct conflicts? 
In the near term, additional research needs to be done 
to determine if the work presented can be reasonably 
developed.  We have shown architecturally that the 
components can be interfaced, but as a system of systems 
that will be ready to appropriately respond to the threat 
needs further developing. 
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